Field Marshal Harold Alexander, edited by military historian John North

VII BURMA

第七章 缅甸

I was visiting our coast defences in the Isle of Wight in the spring of 1942 when I received an urgent message from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to report to him at once. I left that afternoon and arrived in London in the evening, to be told that I was to proceed at once to take over command of the army in Burma. I said, ‘What do you mean by at once?’ The answer was, ‘At once, within a few hours.’

The Japanese advance from Thailand into Burma had begun on 16 January 1942, and we had suffered a succession of reverses. Within a month Rangoon itself had been threatened.

I went back to my house near Windsor to pack my things and left immediately for Hurn Airport, near Southampton, where an aircraft was waiting to take me and others, including Wingate and a number of R.A.F. officers, to Egypt. As we had to fly across occupied France and the Mediterranean, which was still in enemy hands, the weather had to be right. It was sufficiently wrong to delay our departure, day by day, for a week, so I spent the next seven days motoring from my home to Hurn and back.

Eventually we took off in a Flying Fortress and flew at an altitude of somewhere between twenty and thirty thousand feet—it was frightfully cold and uncomfortable. We were shot at by German anti-aircraft guns over France but escaped the German fighters. After a flight of sixteen or seventeen hours we touched down in Egypt, where I took another plane for India, and then on to Burma. I reached Rangoon on 5 March—too late to save the situation.

1942年春天，当我接到帝国总参谋长立即向他报到的加急电报时，我正在视察我们在怀特岛的海岸防御阵地。我下午离开怀特岛，傍晚抵达伦敦。他告诉我，立刻接管在缅甸的陆军司令部。我说：”你说的立刻是什么意思？”回答是：”马上，几小时内。”

日本人已经于1942年1月16日从泰国进军缅甸，而我们则一直在走背字。一个月内，仰光本身就受到了威胁。

我返回温莎附近的家，收拾了我的东西，立即前往南安普敦附近的赫恩机场。那里已有一架飞机正在等着接我和其他人（包括温盖特和几位皇家空军的军官）飞往埃及。由于我们不得不飞越已被占领的法国和仍在敌人掌握之中的地中海，因此必须选择恰当的天气。这就足以耽搁我们的起飞了，日复一日，等了一个星期，于是整整七天就是不断乘车往返于赫恩和我家之间。

最后，我们乘坐的”空中堡垒”终于起飞了。飞行高度大约2千至3千英尺——冷得可怕，且极不舒服。我们在法国上空遭到德军高射炮的射击，但没有遭遇德军的战斗机。经过16或17小时的飞行，我们在埃及降落，在那里我又换乘另一架飞机飞往印度，再飞往缅甸。我于3月5日抵达仰光——要挽救形势已经太晚了。

In Rangoon, I found that the remnants of 17 Division, which had lost most of its artillery at the crossing of the Sittang River, was holding a defensive position around Pegu, about fifty miles north of Rangoon, and was separated from Burma I Division at Toungoo by over 125 miles. Through the heavily wooded country between these two divisions, the Japanese had been infiltrating, with the undoubted object of encircling our left flank and seizing our base at Rangoon behind our backs.

It was clear to me that there was only one possible move to save the situation—which was indeed serious—and that was to prevent any further infiltration by closing the gap between 17 Division and Burma I Division and uniting the two formations. I therefore ordered 17 Division to attack northwards and the Burma Division to strike south. These attacks were duly launched but failed to make any appreciable ground. The Japanese were already too strongly in position between the two formations.

It was clear that the retention of Rangoon was impossible with the forces at my disposal, dispersed as they were and with half of them already encircled. The day after my arrival I therefore ordered the evacuation to begin at daylight the following morning, and the demolition of the port and its installations to be carried out thereafter as quickly as possible. I could not save Rangoon but I could save the Army, with luck. The loss of our base would be a most serious matter, as we should have to depend on the scattered stores and dumps spread about in central and northern Burma. When these were used up, the Army would be crippled unless supplies could be sent in over the mountains from India; but, apart from a few mule tracks, communication with India was non-existent. It seemed that we must do the best with what we had. With Chinese assistance—however doubtful—we should be able at least to make the Japanese advance into Burma slow and costly. Such were the thoughts in my mind when I ordered the destruction and evacuation of Rangoon.

在仰光，我发现第17师残部（已在渡过锡当河时丢掉了大部分火炮）在仰光以北约50英里的勃固附近占领了防御阵地，与位于东吁的缅甸第1师相距超过125英里。日本人一直在通过两师之间的茂密丛林进行渗透，其目的无疑是包围我们的左翼，并夺取我们背后的仰光基地。

我很清楚，挽救这种形势（确实非常严峻）的唯一可能动作是封闭第17师和缅甸第1师之间的间隙，并使两师的队形连接起来，以防止敌军的进一步渗透。因此，我命令第17师向北进攻，而缅甸师向南突击。两个方向的攻击适时发起，但没有明显进展。位于两师之间的日军已经太强大了。

很明显，以我手头的兵力保守仰光已经是不可能的了。这些部队高度分散，且有一半已被包围。因此，在我到达的第二天，我命令从第二天早晨开始利用白天撤退，并在开始撤退后尽快破坏港口及其设施。我虽然救不了仰光，但如果幸运的话，我可以拯救军队。丧失基地是一个最严重的事件，因为我们只能依靠那些分散的储备，沮丧之情必然会在缅甸中部和北部蔓延开来。当这些储备耗尽时，如果不能从印度越过高山将补给运进来的话，那么陆军将无力继续作战。但是，除了几条骡马小道，与印度之间并不存在交通线。看来我们只能以已所有，尽己所能了。在中国人的帮助下（不过不够可靠），我们至少应当能够让进入缅甸的日军进展慢一些，损失大一些。这就是我命令撤出并破坏仰光时头脑中的想法。

As the campaign progressed it became increasingly clear that we were not strong enough to do more than slow down the enemy’s advance; and that, eventually, to save the Army, I should have to get it back to India. If I could delay the Japanese until the monsoon broke, time would be gained for the Indian forces to man the frontier and save the eastern states of India from any Japanese incursion.

Work was started at once to improve the virtually non-existent communications from Mandalay to Imphal; and, in the final withdrawal over the Chindwin River, although we had to abandon all our wheeled vehicles, in the third week of May the last soldier of the old Burma Army crossed over the frontier with the monsoon at his heels.

The evacuation of Burma was a complete military defeat—and we had been beaten in a straightforward fight by an enemy who was not greatly superior in numbers but whose troops had been trained in, and equipped for, jungle warfare. Our troops were not.

In our operations we were tied to the only two roads that run north and south from Mandalay to Rangoon, because the Army’s transport was composed entirely of wheeled vehicles which could not operate off the roads. Furthermore, the Japanese had complete control of the air, while we had no air support after the loss of Rangoon. What remained of the Burma Army was eventually saved from the wreck of the campaign more by luck than by anything else.

Looking back over the years with the knowledge I now have of the situation that existed when I took over command early in March 1942, I realize that I ought to have ordered an earlier evacuation of Burma. But at the time I was not prepared to admit defeat before I had done everything possible. This delay resulted in the whole of our forces in the south of Burma being encircled and gave the Japanese the chance to destroy them as organized formations—and they missed their chance!

战局发展越来越清楚地表明，除了迟滞敌人进军之外，我们没有足够的实力再干其他事。最后，为了挽救陆军，我将不得不把部队带回印度。如果我能将日军迟滞到季风来临，那么就为印度赢得了在边境布防的时间，从而使印度东部各邦免遭日军入侵。

我们立即开始了改善实际上并不存在的从曼德勒到英帕尔交通线的工作。在最终撤过钦敦江时，尽管我们丢掉了所有的轮式车辆，但还是在5月的最后一周使原缅甸陆军的最后一名士兵跨过了边境，而季风也接踵而至。

缅甸撤退完全是个军事失败——我们遭到了数量并不占优，但其部队训练和装备却都适应丛林战的敌人的迎头痛击，而我们的部队却不适应丛林战。

在作战中，由于陆军的运输力量全部由轮式车辆组成，不能离开道路行驶，所以我们被紧紧地捆绑在两条仅有的从曼德勒到仰光的南北向公路上。此外，日军掌握了全部制空权，而我们在失去仰光之后则没有空中支援。能把缅甸陆军最终从战役失败中挽救出来，更多的是依赖运气，而不是其他。

以我现有的认识回顾以往岁月，根据1942年3月初我接手指挥时的态势，我感到应当再早一点下达撤出缅甸的命令。但在当时，我不准备在竭尽所能之前就接受失败。这一耽搁导致位于缅甸南部的所有部队被包围，为日军提供了将其作为成建制部队歼灭的机会——而他们丧失了机会！

Still, I don’t admit that we would have had to lay down our arms in surrender. If we could not have broken through the road block at Pegu which barred our way to the north I was prepared to order units, groups, and individuals to save themselves by fighting their way out, or, by working through the jungle, to join up at Tharrawaddy in the Irrawaddy Valley, where we could re-form. Of course, we would have lost all our transport and heavy equipment, but those who got through would still have had their personal weapons and would have been there to fight another day.

Fortunately for us, the Japanese withdrew the road block, which had probably been a strong flank guard for their encircling forces, and the way was opened for us to the Irrawaddy Valley.

至今我依然不接受放下武器投降的做法。如果我们不能突破北进路线上勃固附近的道路封锁，我准备命令小分队、小组乃至个人打出去以拯救他们自己；或者，自行在丛林中开辟生路，在位于伊洛瓦底江河谷的沙耶瓦底会合，在那里可以重组部队。当然，我们将损失所有的运输工具和重型装备，但那些逃出来的人会携带其个人武器，并将在那里继续战斗。

对我们幸运的是，日军撤走了道路封锁，也许那里的部队是他们包围部队的强大侧卫。通往伊洛瓦底江河谷的道路为我们敞开了。

Later in the campaign, when we were joined by the Chinese, I learned that they would fight in defence of an area, even accepting encirclement, and then under cover of darkness slip away through the thick jungle and join up farther north. This delightfully elastic maneuver apparently had no adverse effect on their morale. In spite of the fact that they never won a battle against the Japs they were always smiling and jolly and in the best of spirits. Most of them were fine-looking young men of big stature, but they were very poorly equipped, even to the extent of only one rifle to three men: one carried the rifle, the next carried the ammunition for it, and the third carried the food.

Only one Chinese army, the Fifth—and this formation was no stronger than a very weak British division—possessed artillery. These pieces were, I think, either the old French 75 mm. of the first world war, or the German 77 mm. of the same period: yet this army had the reputation of being the best in the whole of the Chinese forces, and I think it was.

战役后期，当中国军队与我们会合时，我得悉他们将在一个地区实施防御战斗，哪怕被包围也在所不惜。若被包围，他们将利用夜色掩护通过茂密的丛林穿出去，并在更北方的地区会合。这一过分乐观的机动显然对他们的士气没有反作用。他们总是面带微笑，兴高采烈，士气高昂。他们中的大多数都是身材高大的漂亮年轻人，但其装备极差，甚至三个人才有一支枪：一个人扛枪，第二个人扛子弹，第三个人带给养。

只有一个中国集团军——第5集团军（其战斗力并不比非常虚弱的一个英国师更强大）拥有炮兵。我想，这些炮不是第一次世界大战时法国造的75毫米旧炮，就是同一时期德国造的77毫米炮。但是，这支集团军在整个中国军队中还是声誉最好的，我认为确实如此。

Before the battle for Mandalay I went round the front to inspect our defences and was much impressed to see how cleverly this Chinese Fifth Army had dug in its field guns, which were well sited and carefully camouflaged. When contact had been gained with the advancing Japanese I again visited the front, and to my astonishment I found that all the artillery had disappeared. When I asked the army commander what had happened to his guns he said that he had withdrawn them to safety.

‘Then you mean,’ I said, ‘that they will take no part in the battle?’

‘Exactly,’ he replied. ‘But then what use are they?’

He said: ‘General, the Fifth Chinese Army is our best army because it is the only one which has any field guns, and I cannot afford to risk those guns. If I lose them the Fifth Army will no longer be our best.’

Brave and friendly as they were, the so-called armies of the Chinese were a serious administrative burden. They arrived in Burma with no proper medical organization, and they also expected me to feed them. Since I was desperately short of all types of supplies for my own forces I can only call the Chinese administrative parasites. Furthermore, they were not allowed to undertake any operational role I gave them until it had been agreed to by their Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek. Since communications with Chunking were so slow as to be almost non-existent I had virtually no operational control over them.

曼德勒会战前，我到前线视察防御，看到中国第5集团军在隐蔽其野战火炮方面是如何聪明，给我留下了深刻印象。他们炮位选择得当，伪装严密。当与推进的日军接触之后我再次视察前线时，令我惊讶的是，我发觉所有火炮均不见了。

我问集团军指挥官他的炮怎么了，他说，他已经将其火炮后撤到安全位置。

“那你的意思是，”我说，”他们不参加战斗了？”

“确实如此。”他答道。

“那它们有什么用？”

他说：”将军，中国第5集团军是我们最好的集团军，因为它是唯一拥有火炮的。我不能让这些炮冒险。如果我损失了这些炮，那么第5集团军就不是最好的了。”

一如他们的勇敢和友好，这支所谓的中国集团军也是一个沉重的后勤保障负担。他们来到缅甸时，没有完善的医疗卫生组织，而且希望我供养他们。由于我自己部队的补给都极度匮乏，所以我们只能将中国人称为后勤寄生虫。此外，除非得到其总司令蒋介石的同意，否则不允许他们执行任何我赋予的作战任务。由于与重庆的通信极慢，甚至都可以称之为没有通信联络，因此实际上我对他们实施不了作战控制。

The American general, Joseph Stilwell, was Chiang Kai-shek’s representative with his armies in Burma, and it was through him that I worked. He was quite a character and a tough little man; his nickname, ‘Vinegar Joe’, suited him like a glove. He had much to bear from his subordinates. One of them was known for short as General Doo; another as General Di. Unhappily, as was remarked at the time, General Di did, but General Doo didn’t.

I don’t think that Stilwell had much of an opinion of us British, but personally he and I got on well together. I always felt that he disliked his position with the Chinese: he was a very senior American general and probably had the feeling that he ought to have been playing a greater part in the war, instead of being relegated to a backwater.

I am aware that most British accounts are unsympathetic to ‘Vinegar Joe’—if only for his practice of ‘cussing’ the British troops under his command beyond the point of endurance; but—to quote an anonymous commentator—Stilwell knew well (none better after his experience with the American Marauders and with his sometimes impossible Chinese) that disaster overtook any army whenever it passed a strange and possibly movable psychological breaking-point where hard-pressed Allied troops suddenly sat down and fell sick, and hard-pressed Japs sat down and actually died.

Certainly, in those dark days he was no defeatist; on the contrary, he showed great courage and fight. When the campaign collapsed he found his way back to India through the jungle on foot, having done all he could for his Chinese forces.

美国将军约瑟夫·史迪威是蒋介石在缅部队的代表，我是通过他开展工作的。他是一位相当有个性，并有些粗暴的男人，外号叫”醋乔”。这外号就像手套一样适于他。其下属（据知一位称为杜将军，另一位简称戴将军）在很多事情上不得不容忍他。但不幸的是，正如当时评论所说，戴将军能够容忍，而杜将军却不能容忍。

我不认为史迪威经常对我们英军指手画脚。他和我私人相处得不错。我总是感到他不喜欢与中国人在一起的职位。也许他认为自己是一位非常高级的美国将军，可能感到自己应在更大的战争舞台上表演，而不是被丢入这一潭死水之中。

我知道大多数英国人不同情”醋乔”——只要其”骂街”习惯超出其指挥的英国部队的容忍度；但是，引用一位匿名评论员的话说，史迪威很清楚（没有人比与美国掠夺者和有时不可忍受的中国人打过交道的他更好地了解），只要灾难超过任何军队奇怪且可能不断”醋乔”史迪威变化的心理崩溃点，那么巨大的压力就会使盟军部队突然停摆并陷入病态，承受巨大压力的日军也会停摆并实际上陷入死亡。

当然，在那些黑暗的日子里，他并不是一位失败主义者；与此相反，他显示出巨大的勇气和战斗精神。当战役崩溃，他步行穿越丛林寻路返回印度时，已经为中国军队做了所能做到的一切。

Before we leave the story of this unhappy campaign I must mention two officers who played a major role in saving the Burma Army. Soon after the evacuation of Rangoon, Lieutenant-General Tom Hutton, who worked so ably as my chief of staff, was recalled to India and was replaced by General Jack Winterton. Winterton was invaluable to me and carried the burden which all chiefs of staff have to shoulder with great distinction; a wise, cheerful, and fine staff officer, and a very agreeable companion.

Since my responsibilities as C.-in-C. in Burma were too varied and widespread to be concerned only with the direction of the two British divisions, I formed 17 Division and Burma I Division into a corps and asked for General Slim from India to command this new set-up. I could not have asked for a finer man. A great fighting commander, he was to make his name not only in this campaign but as the victorious commander of the forces that later recaptured Burma from the Japanese, and turned defeat into victory.

在离开这一令人不快的战役故事之前，我必须提到两位军官。他们在拯救英军的过程中扮演了主要角色。刚撤出仰光不久，汤姆·赫特中将（我的参谋长，工作能力极为出色）被召回印度，杰克·温特顿将军接替了他。温特顿对我来说是无价之宝。他以优异的表现承担了所有参谋长必须承担的重担。他是一位聪明、快乐、出色的参谋军官，是一位非常随和的伙伴。

由于我作为缅甸战区总司令的责任过于繁杂和广泛，以致不能将精力仅仅集中在指挥两个英国师上。所以，我将第17师和缅甸第1师编为一个军，要求斯利姆将军从印度过来指挥这个新成立的军。我找不到比他更好的人了。他是一位伟大的作战指挥官。他不仅将其名字写人了这次战役，而且作为后来从日本人手中重新夺回缅甸，在缅甸转败为胜的部队的指挥官写入了历史。

March-May 1942

缅甸 1942年3月~5月

When I arrived in Rangoon at the beginning of March 1942, charged with the defence of Burma, the Japanese had already crossed the Lower Sittang, where Indian 17 Division had suffered a near disaster, and were threatening to envelop Rangoon. If the city were to fall, sea communications with India would be severed—and land communications were virtually non-existent. If Burma itself were lost, the land link with China would be lost, and the way would lie open for a Japanese invasion of India.

I left Rangoon just before its fall and flew north to establish Army H.Q. at Maymyo, beyond Mandalay. On 13 March I returned to Prome, where Slim was to organize all available forces to form Burma Corps. I had Burma I Division and Indian 17 Division now much under strength and lacking equipment; and the newly arrived 7 Armoured Brigade. No further reinforcement could be expected; and, after 23 March, when the airfield at Magwe was attacked by Japanese bombers, no air force remained for support and reconnaissance. Furthermore, the breakdown of the civil administration and the flood of refugees hampered military operations.

At this time Indian 17 Division was about thirty miles south of Prome and Burma I Division near Toungoo on the other side of the jungle-clad hills called the Pegu Yomas. Relief for Burma I Division could be counted on by the arrival of part of Chinese Fifth Army, under Stilwell’s command. The plan was for Burma Corps to concentrate for the defence of the Irrawaddy valley, while the Chinese held the front in the valley of the Sittang. To assist this concentration of force, Indian 17 Division was withdrawn northward for the close defence of Prome.

当1942年3月初我到达仰光时，主要任务是组织缅甸的防御。日本人已经越过锡当河，那里的印度第17师已近乎陷入灭顶之灾，仰光则已受到被包围的威胁。如果该城陷落，与印度的海上交通线将被切断，而陆上交通线则实际上根本不存在。如果缅甸本身沦陷，则不仅失去了与中国的陆上联系，而且日军人侵印度的通道也将打开。

我在仰光即将陷落之前离开，飞往北方，在曼德勒东北的眉谬建立陆军指挥部。3月13日，我返回卑谬，斯利姆正在那里将所有可用部队编组为缅甸军团。我现在手中只有兵力不足、装备缺乏的缅甸第1师和印度第17师，还有新到达的第7装甲旅。再也不能指望更多的增援了。当3月23日马圭机场遭到日军轰炸机的突击之后，空军的火力和侦察支援也没有了。更糟的是，民政系统的崩溃和难民潮严重妨碍了军事行动。

此时，印度第17师位于卑谬以南大约30英里处，而缅甸第1师则在东吁附近，位于丛林覆盖的被称为勃固夭马斯山的那一边。解救缅甸第1师可以依靠史迪威指挥下的第5集团军的部分部队。为缅甸军团制定的计划是集中兵力防守伊洛瓦底江河谷，同时中国军队坚守锡当河河谷防线。为有助于这一兵力集中，印度第17师向后撤，以便严密防守卑谬。

On 24 March the Japanese attacked those columns of Chinese Fifth Army that had reached Toungoo. The town was lost, and the Chinese retreated up the Sittang valley to Pyinmana. To relieve pressure on the Chinese, Indian 17 Division and 7 Armoured Brigade attacked at Shwedaung, with heavy losses on both sides.

On 1 April the Japanese attacked Prome in force and, after a fierce struggle, Indian 17 Division, with the armour, effected a fighting withdrawal to Kyaukpadaung-Allanmyo, where Burma I division joined the front.

Now the immediate purpose was to protect the oil wells at Yenangyaung and defend Upper Burma; but it was still imperative to maintain contact with the Chinese. I therefore ordered a further withdrawal of Burma Corps in order to stand on the line Magwe—on the Irrawaddy—to Taungdwingyi. I had arranged for the Chinese to extend westward and take over the last-named town; but they failed to put in an appearance.

3月24日，日军攻击抵达东吁的中国第5集团军各纵队。东吁城丢失，中国军队沿锡当河河谷撤至彬马那。为缓解对中国军队的压力，印度第17师和第7装甲旅攻击瑞当，双方都损失惨重。4月1日，日军对卑谬展开大规模攻击，经过激烈战斗，印度第17师和装甲部队边打边撤至皎勃东至阿兰谬，缅甸第1师也在那里加入该战线。

现在的直接目的是保护仁安羌的油井，并防守上缅甸。但是，仍有必要与中国军队保持联系。因此，我命令缅甸军团继续撤退，以便立足于伊洛瓦底江畔的马圭至东敦枝一线。我安排中国军队向西伸展，接管东敦枝，但他们没有出现。

On 10 April the Japanese struck hard again; and, in spite of some local successes, Burma I Division was forced to withdraw from the region of Magwe. The retreat was covered by armour; but the enemy followed up quickly, and the division was soon on the road to the oilfields at Yenangyaung. Bodies of Japanese had already infiltrated into the town before the division’s arrival, and the sabotaging of the oilfields was now inevitable. These advanced bodies of Japanese had fought their way through to the Pin Chaung on the northern side, while 38 Division of Chinese Sixth Army—lent to Burma Corps—attacked, with limited success, the Japanese now well established on the south side of the Pin Chaung. Eventually Burma I Division fought its way out on foot, and continued northward, covered by the Chinese division and 7 Armoured Brigade.

The position of Indian 17 Division, still retained in and about Taungdwingyi, was now precarious. For disaster had overtaken the Chinese in the Shan States. Mawchi was lost, and by 18 April, the Chinese Sixth Army had been driven north of Loikaw. When the Japanese reached Loilem the remnants of Chinese Sixth Army fled for home up the Burma Road; and although a division of the Chinese Fifth Army from Pyinmana, under Stilwell’s personal command, attacked and recaptured Taunggyi, Ho-Pong, and Loilem, very shortly it was to move up the Loilem-Lashio road to join in the general retreat to China. Yet another Chinese Army—rather inscrutably described as the Sixty-Sixth—had been detailed to defend the Lashio area: but the Japanese entered the town on 29 April, and the Chinese Sixty-Sixth Army also took the road for home. Now the only Chinese troops remaining in Burma were the remnants of the Fifth Army who had streamed past Meiktila towards Mandalay, and 38 Division with Burma Corps.

4月10日，日军再次发起猛攻。缅甸第1师尽管取得了某些局部胜利，但还是被迫从马圭地区撤退。撤退虽有装甲部队掩护，但敌人还是很快跟了上来，而该师则刚刚走上通往仁安羌油田的公路。日军主力已经在该师抵达之前渗入仁安羌城中，油田的破坏已经是不可避免的了。这些推进的日军部队沿颦河河道北岸一路突击前进，与此同时中国第6集团军第38师（配属缅甸军团）对其展开攻击但成果有限。现在，日军已经在颦河河道南岸建立了稳固的立足点。最后，缅甸第1师在中国师和第7装甲旅的掩护下，继续徒步向北突围。

印度第17师仍然坚守的东敦枝附近阵地现在岌岌可危。掸邦的中国军队已经大难临头。茂奇已经丢失；中国第6集团军到4月18日已被驱赶至垒固以北。当日军抵达罗列姆时，中国第6集团军的残部就沿缅甸公路逃回国去了。尽管史迪威亲自指挥的第5集团军一个师从彬马那攻击并夺回了东枝、和榜和罗列姆，但不久便沿着罗列姆至腊戍的公路加入了向中国的总撤退。另一个中国集团军（被莫测高深地称为第66集团军）一直驻防腊戍地区，但当日军于4月29日进入该城后，中国第66集团军也夺路回国了。现在留在缅甸的中国军队只有穿过密铁拉向曼德勒撤退的第5集团军残部，以及与缅甸军团在一起的第38师。

The Japanese were in Bhamo on 4 May and in Myitkyina on 8 May, and it was obvious that Burma Corps must retreat into India without delay. By the 25th it was back on a weak, extended line from Chauk, on the Irrawaddy, to Meiktila. Indian 17 Division having now withdrawn from Taungdwingyi. This division, with 7 Armoured Brigade, was soon at Kyaukse, covering the Irrawaddy crossings at Mandalay: farther west the remainder of the corps was retreating towards the river. After a series of rearguard actions Indian 17 Division and 7 Armoured Brigade crossed the Irrawaddy by the Ava bridge, which was then wrecked. Burma I Division used ferries at Sameikkon. By 28 April, the whole corps, together with Chinese 38 Division, was beyond the river along a line from Sagaing to Monywa on the Chindwin. The Chinese parted company with the corps at Ye-U, going north to Wuntho and eventually reaching not China but India, by way of Paungybin and the Upper Chindwin.

On 5 May the retreat was resumed, after dumps of supplies had been formed along the track leading to the Chindwin. Burma I Brigade was despatched across country to strike the Chindwin at Pantha. On 16 May it arrived at Tamu, on the Indian frontier. Burma 2 Brigade, which had withdrawn up the west bank of the Irrawaddy, also moved independently, following the Myittha valley to rejoin at Kalemyo. The main column reached Shwegyin on the Chindwin, where the troops, still under fierce land and air attack, were embarked on river steamers to be taken upstream for six miles to Kalewa. Tanks and much of the transport had to be destroyed before embarkation. 48 Brigade was taken farther upstream to Sittang, whence they marched through the hills to Tamu. The main body of Burma Corps also arrived at Tamu, after undertaking the ninety-mile march up the Kabaw valley. The Burma rescue operation—as I have to regard it—was over.

日军5月4日进入八莫，5月8日进入密支那。显然，缅甸军团必须毫不犹豫地撤入印度。到25日，就只有一条从稍埠沿伊洛瓦底江到密铁拉的薄弱防线了；印度第17师正从东敦枝后撤。该师与第7装甲旅不久后抵达皎施，掩护位于曼德勒的伊洛瓦底江渡口；更往西，军团残部正在向江边撤退。在实施了一系列后卫行动之后，印度第17师和第7装甲旅通过阿瓦桥越过伊洛瓦底江，然后就将该桥破坏了。缅甸第1师在锡米孔用渡船过江。到4月28日，整个军团，包括中国第38师，都过了伊洛瓦底江，撤至实皆至钦敦江上的蒙育瓦（望濑）一线。中国军队在耶乌与军团分道扬镳，向北去往文多，但最终并未回到中国，而是经庞宾和钦敦江上游进入印度。

5月5日，经过已经成形的钦敦江补给线令人沮丧的补给之后，继续撤退。我们派出缅甸第1旅越野突击班塔附近的钦敦江段。5月16日，该师到达印度国境线上的德穆。从伊洛瓦底江西岸撤过来的缅甸第2旅也是沿密达河谷独立运动，在吉灵庙再次会合。其主力抵达钦敦江畔的瑞金，在那里，部队（仍遭到地面和空中火力的猛烈突击）被装上江轮，溯江而上，运往6英里之外的葛礼瓦。坦克和许多运输车辆不得不在装载前破坏掉。第48旅被运往更上游的锡当；他们从那里行军穿过大山到达德穆。缅甸军团主力也在经过90英里沿加包山谷的行军之后，到达德穆。缅甸救援行动（我不得不这么称呼它）结束了。

录入校对：观棋不语

来源：The Alexander Memoirs,